Dartmouth College

Dartmouth Digital Commons
Dartmouth College Undergraduate Theses

Theses and Dissertations

6-1-1996

Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation
Scott M. Silver
Dartmouth College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/senior_theses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Silver, Scott M., "Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation" (1996). Dartmouth
College Undergraduate Theses. 174.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/senior_theses/174

This Thesis (Undergraduate) is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth College Undergraduate Theses by an
authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu.

May 31, 1996

Implementation and
Analysis of Software
Based Fault Isolation
Scott M. Silver

Dartmouth Computer Science Technical Report PCS-TR96-287
Senior Honors Thesis
Dartmouth College
June 1996

Abstract
Extensible applications rely upon user-supplied, untrusted modules to extend their functionality. To remain reliable, applications must isolate themselves from user modules.
One method places each user module in a separate address space (process), which uses
hardware virtual memory support to isolate the user process. Costly inter-process communication, however, prohibits frequent communication between the application and
the untrusted module. We implemented and analyzed a software method for isolating an
application from user modules. The technique uses a single address space. We provide
a logical address space and per-module access to system resources for each module.
Our software technique is a two-step process. First, we augment a module’s code so
that it cannot access any address outside of an assigned range. Second, we prevent the
module from using system calls to access resources outside of its fault domain.
This method for software isolation has two particular advantages over processes. First,
for frequently communicating modules, we significantly reduce context switch time.
Thus, we demonstrate near-optimal inter-module communication using software fault
isolation. Second, our software-based techniques provide an efficient and expedient
solution in situations where only one address space is available (e.g., kernel, or a singleaddress-space operating system).
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Terms

1.0 Terms
- an address space and a set of inter-fault domain calls. A
module assigned to a fault domain cannot directly access any resource
outside of its fault domain.

fault domain

- a collection of functions permitted to access any address
or resource allocated to a fault domain.
trusted module

host module - a trusted module that owns, and exists in, a fault domain. A
host module provides the runtime assistance needed to load, initialize,
and execute untrusted modules.
untrusted module - a module that contains a set of functions with defined
entry points. The implementations are not trusted, so they are restricted
to their own fault domain.
hardware fault domain - same as fault domain, except the address space is
allocated to it by the operating system, which uses a memory management unit to enforce the address space.
logical context switch - the saving of the current context and a subsequent
switch to another logical fault domain. This context switch does not
require kernel services. Fewer data are saved, and no (full) address space
change is required.

2.0 Introduction
2.1 Applications

An extensible application (trusted host) can load and execute untrusted,
user modules at runtime. Faults caused by an untrusted module should
not halt or otherwise corrupt the host. To isolate faults between a host
and a user module, operating systems provide fault domains, such as processes. Processes use separate address spaces to create fault domains.
The host and an untrusted module communicate using various forms of
inter-process communication. Unfortunately, both processes and interprocess communication consume significant resources for frequent communication. In addition, some operating systems (such as MacOS) do
not provide separate address spaces. Recent trends to modularize soft-
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ware in both industry and academia have prompted the need for efficient
fault isolation.
Extensible operating systems import user modules into the kernel to
improve performance and extend functionality [engler:exokernel, bershad:spin, osdi:panel]. The goal is to simultaneously increase performance and allow modularity while keeping the host (kernel) isolated
from the module. For example, some kernels can import small user modules to efficiently dispatch packets as they arrive from networking hardware [mccaine:packet]. To maintain the reliability of the kernel, these
packet filters are interpreted. Software fault isolation could allow these
packet filters to be translated to native code and execute in a separate logical fault domain [wahbe:sbfi]. More ambitious systems, such as the
SPIN operating system, allow user modules to aggressively extend the
kernel [bershad:spin]. Security and reliability is maintained by the use of
special compilers and type-safe languages at the cost of speed and platform and language neutrality.
In industry, the World Wide Web, despite its plethora of security problems, is taking the world by storm [hpp:blackw]. Untrusted modules
such as Java Applets are currently fault isolated through interpretation of
type-safe bytecodes [colusa:omniware, hpp:blackw, gosling:java]. To
increase the speed of an applet it may be necessary to translate it to native
code [adl-t:omnimobile]. Once the applet is executing in native code, it
must execute in an isolated environment to protect the browser from the
applet.
2.2 Introduction to Software-Based Fault Isolation

An application or operating system that can dynamically load untrusted
modules at run time needs to create an environment in which untrusted
modules can run efficiently. In addition to good performance, untrusted
modules must not interfere or otherwise corrupt the host module. This
means that an untrusted module must be in a separate fault domain from
its host. A fault is caused when an illegal action is performed (e.g., access
to a forbidden resource).
The classic method of isolating two domains uses hardware assisted virtual memory and UNIX processes (hereafter referred to as processes) to
create separate address spaces and separate resource permissions on a
per-process basis. For a host module to communicate with an untrusted
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module or vice versa, some form of inter-domain communication is used.
Pipes or remote procedure calls (RPC) are the most common [birrel:rpc].
Using multiple processes for multiple untrusted modules often yields
unacceptable performance for frequently communicating modules, due to
the high cost of inter-process communication and context switches. In
addition, inter-process control transfer which is inherent in most process
communication, does not necessarily scale with a processor’s integer performance [wahbe:sfi]. The cost of an RPC for frequently communicating
domains is prohibitive. An RPC requires: copying arguments from caller
to callee, a trap into the kernel, a context switch, copying the return
value, and another context switch. Even the fastest RPC is several orders
of magnitude slower than a function call [bershad:lrpc].
In this paper, we explore recent methods for creating and maintaining
software-enforced fault domains [wahbe:sfi]. We remove the requirement for separate address spaces by creating logical fault domains within
a single address space provided by a single process.
On a UNIX-like operating system, two sets of resources need to be protected: memory and everything else. A technique called software fault
isolation is used to enforce the logical assignment of address space to an
untrusted module. The idea is to restrict a module to a set of valid
addresses assigned to the fault domain. Since all other resources (besides
CPU utilization) are accessed through system calls, per-domain access to
system calls protects other resources. For example, the system calls,
read, write, open, and ioctl provide access to files and other devices.
To restrict access to those resources, it is only necessary to reroute read,
write, and open through access controlling functions.
On other platforms various CPU specific instructions must also be protected. For example, on a 68000 running MacOS, both the A-line and Fline exception handlers must be rerouted through an access controlling
function. A-line and F-line instructions provide access to operating system services [moto:68k].
Multiple fault domains existing in one address space allows for near-optimal RPC performance. An RPC is a transfer of control from one fault
domain to another. In the process model RPC performance is bound by
resources consumed by context-switching, marshalling the arguments
from one address space to the the other, and system calling. Under the
single process model, an RPC requires only the time to copy arguments,
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and to set up the lighter software-enforced fault context. We reduce the
cost of these activities, and thus the cost of an RPC, through software
fault isolation techniques.
3.0 General Ideas
In this section we describe the concepts behind software fault isolation
and sandboxing. In Section 5.0 we describe our implementation.
3.1 Protecting Memory

To protect memory we must determine a general technique for restricting
a module to an arbitrary region in memory. We prefix an untrusted
instruction with an additional sequence of instructions to check the target effective address. An unsafe instruction is a load, branch, or store
whose target address cannot be determined before runtime. For example,
program-counter (PC) relative addresses can be verified at compile time.
In contrast, arbitrary jumps, like returns from functions cannot be verified
at compile time. Thus, the inserted code checks to see that the target
address is within the segment. If not, a fault is generated. Consider
Figure 1 to be part of an untrusted module. The goal of the technique is
to prevent the instruction from reading memory outside of its designated
segment. Depending on the desired level of isolation and performance,
we can chose not to check the target address of loads. In our implementation, however, we chose to check the target address of loads.

FIGURE 1.

Pseudo code for an unsafe instruction. Since we cannot determine the address
contained by r0 at runtime, this instruction is unsafe.

(1)

load r2, (r0) ; load contents of memory address r0 into r2

In Figure 2 the general prefix sequence is shown. The “trap” pseudoinstruction is a system dependent action. In most UNIX implementations, the “trap” would most likely send a signal to the untrusted module
that performed the illegal action.
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FIGURE 2.

Pseudo code for isolating an address in software. We prefix the instruction in line (3)
because it is unsafe. Line (3) will not execute unless it passes the legality check in line
(1).

(1)
(2)
(3)

legal = check r0
trap if (not legal)
load r2, (r0)

; is r2 in this fault domain
; no? notify parent
; yes? allow load to proceed as usual

The speed of an isolated load or store depends upon the complexity and
length of the check code. To reduce the complexity of the check, we
restrict the domain of the target address to a contiguous segment of memory. Thus, in a simple implementation, we need two extra variables to
either hold fence posts of the segment or base and bounds addresses.
Figure 3 depicts the use of fence posts, both of which are held in registers. Line (1) in Figure 2 expands to lines (1) - (4) in Figure 3. This technique is called segment matching [wahbe:sfi]. Notice that this technique
requires 4 instructions.

FIGURE 3.

Pseudo code for segment matching. We compare the address contained in the target
register (r0), to beginning and end of the segment (contained in rBeginning and rEnd).
We trap if the target address is not between those two “fence posts”.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

compare r0, rBeginning
blt illegal
compare r0, rEnd
bgt illegal
load r2, (r0)
illegal:
trap

;
;
;
;
;

r2 < beginning?
yes? illegal access
r2 > end
yes? illegal access
perform load

; notify parent

If we no longer require that faults actually be identified, but only guarantee that the target address be valid (but not necessarily the computed one)
we can remove line (2) in Figure 2. This technique is called sandboxing
[wahbe:sfi]. Figure 4 shows the pseudo code for sandboxing. Within a
segment the top k bits of all addresses, called the segment identifier, are
constant. If we simply set the top k bits of each target address to the segment identifier we guarantee that the address must be in that segment. If
the target address were an illegal address, it would be prevented from
accessing memory outside of the fault domain. Notice that this technique
takes only two instructions. The first instruction clears the segment identifier of the target address, and the second instruction sets the segment
identifier of the target address. For this technique to be efficient, the
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masks should be stored in dedicated registers since two load penalties for
every target instruction may be unacceptable.

FIGURE 4.

Pseudo code for sandboxing. We drop the requirement to identify the location of the
fault. Line (1) clears the segment identifier of the address contained in r0. Line (2) sets
the segment identifier. Line (3) can now only access addresses within the segment.

(1)
(2)
(3)

r0 = r0 AND rClearSegmentIdentifier ; clear seg identifier
r0 = r0 OR rSetSegmentIdentifier
; set seg identifier
load r2, (r0)
; perform load

We still have not addressed several outstanding security problems. An
untrusted module could arrange to jump directly to the load and avoid the
prefix code. A module could arrange this by using code that detects that
it is sandboxed, and then arranging a branch to skip over the check code.
This problem is solved by reserving both code and data registers, that is,
disallowing user code to use these registers. The “data register” is used
as the target register for every load or store. The “code register” is used
as the target register for every indirect branch or jump. Thus, each load
or store uses the special data register, which can contain only a valid data
segment address. This eliminates a module from containing self-modifying code (on systems that map those pages writable). However, a module
could generate code in its heap, static storage, or stack that performs illegal instructions. Since the special register reserved for indirect branches
and jumps can contain only a valid address in the code segment, not the
data segment, a module cannot jump to generated code.
Implicitly, we stated that there are separate “code” and “data” segments.
It follows that there are also separate data and code “segment setting
masks”. All of these masks are stored in reserved registers for fast
access. The total reserved register count is 5: one dedicated code register,
one dedicated data register, one clear segment mask, one set code segment mask, and one set data segment mask.
The result of reserving 5 registers on a RISC architecture with at least 32
registers is marginal [wahbe:sfi]. On older CISC architectures, however,
such as the Intel x86 with only 8 general-purpose registers, the penalty
might be too great.
A module can be sandboxed at runtime or at compile time. If the module
is sandboxed at runtime, then the sandboxer can be highly architecture
dependent. Sandboxing at runtime might also shorten the verification
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step (see Section 4.5). If a module is sandboxed at compile time, the
runtime must determine if a module is correctly sandboxed. One method
uses a verifier to actually check the module and declare it safe or unsafe.
Another method involves creating a trusted compiler that cryptographically signs the sandboxed module with a private key. Since the public
key of the compiler is known, authentication will only succeed if the
module has not been modified. This method is used in the SPIN operating system [bershad:spin].
By using public key encryption and a compiler to sandbox a module, it is
easier to create a more platform-independent sandboxer. A sandboxer
created by modifying a compiler also makes it possible to use later optimization stages of the compiler. This is the technique we chose.
3.2 Runtime Support

The runtime support primarily provides services for loading untrusted
modules and making cross domain (RPC) calls. In addition to executing
untrusted modules, the runtime code limits access to system calls and
other resources.
An untrusted module is assigned a segment of the host’s address space
and is loaded into that segment. If an operating supports access to individual page permissions, the code pages are marked executable and readable, but not writable. The data pages are marked readable and writable,
but not executable. If the module is already sandboxed, it is verified by
either checking the signature of the compiler or by using a verifier (see
Section 4.5).
To catch system calls, the runtime code must use the sandboxer or some
other mechanism to cause system calls to pass through some procedure
that can screen access to potentially dangerous functions.
3.3 Crossing Fault Domains

Due to the cost of process-level context switching traditional RPCs are
slow. Our goal is to create RPCs that perform near-optimally. An optimal RPC would take exactly the amount of time that a regular function
call takes.
There are three types of fault domain crossings: host to untrusted,
untrusted to host, and untrusted to untrusted.
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Host to an untrusted module:

the host must set up the reserved sandboxing
registers, save its own context, restore sandbox context (the special sandboxing registers, and the stack pointer), swap stack pointers, possibly
copy arguments, and call the desired function. A host may also wish to
zero out all non-used registers to avoid leaking information from the host
to the untrusted module. Upon return the context and stack pointer are
restored, and the return value is copied if necessary. In the case of an
application binary interface (ABI) that allows arguments to be passed in
registers (and has no recursion), no argument copying is necessary.
Note that all indirect branches or jumps must be
to a valid code address within the untrusted module’s segment. So, to
jump out of its fault domain, an untrusted module must jump through a
carefully constructed jump table. If the CPU on which the system is running has a direct jump or branch instruction in which the target address is
encoded in the instruction itself we can create a “hard coded” jump table.
The jump table would consist of a series of direct jumps. At load time,
the host modifies each jump instruction in the table so that each is hard
coded to jump to a particular address. In addition the page that contains
the jump table is marked unwritable in the host code to the untrusted
module. If the CPU does not have a direct jump instruction, however, we
can employ a special jump table and a special sequence of instructions.
The basic idea is to place a jump table in an unwritable page somewhere
in the untrusted module’s valid data segment (see Section 4.3). We
describe this technique in more detail in Section 5.2.2.

Untrusted module to host:

3.4 Optimization

We can make several optimizations to sandboxed code. Special registers
like the stack pointer (SP) and the frame pointer can be sandboxed once
for multiple unsafe instructions before a control transfer. The sandboxer
can verify that loads from only small (valid) offsets from the SP are
made, and thus safely sandbox the SP once at the beginning of a function.
Often CPUs provide indexed addressing modes. The indexes are usually
limited to small ranges, like 16 bits. Compilers often use indexed
addressing modes for accessing arrays in loops and for accessing elements from a known reference register (e.g. the SP). If we place guard
pages (pages marked not readable, writable, or executable) the size of the
index range at the beginning and end of each of our data and code segments, we only have to sandbox the base address (as opposed to the
index) once, outside of the loop.
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3.5 Verification

We must verify that an untrusted module is sandboxed before we execute
it. There are two main methods for verifying a module. If we sandbox
untrusted modules at compile time we must either build a separate application which analyzes the module, or use a trusted compiler that cryptographically signs an untrusted module after it has finished. At load time,
we simply verify the signature of the compiler and execute the module.
Wahbe et. al. present a method for verification at runtime [wahbe:sfi].
4.0 Implementation
The current implementation of our software-based fault isolation system
is designed for the DEC Alpha under Digital Unix 3.2 (formerly OSF).
The primary goal of this design is to explore the possibility of a portable
sandboxer and runtime. We implemented two versions. The first sandboxes the intermediate language representation (used by the GCC, the
Gnu C Compiler) of a module [stallman:gcc]. This version works for
much common code; for a complete solution, we found it necessary to
modify the Alpha-specific code generator of GCC.
4.1 Sandboxing Using RTL

The first sandboxer is a modified form of GCC. We added sandboxing as
the first “optimization” pass on the intermediate translated form (RTL,
register transfer language). Since RTL is designed to be architecture neutral, our hope is that this sandboxer can be easily ported to other architectures.
GCC is the compiler created and distributed by the Free Software Foundation. It is designed to execute on many platforms and compile many
languages to binaries on multiple target platforms and architectures. It is
primarily used on UNIX and UNIX-derivative platforms, but also runs
under Windows and MacOS. By choosing GCC as the sandboxer, we are
limiting our sandboxer to platforms on which GCC runs and to any language front end which is written for GCC. There are many such platforms, however, so it is more portable than a binary-code or assemblycode patcher.
GCC translates a source file to RTL on a function-by-function basis.
Next, multiple optimization passes run on the RTL such as code motion
10 of 32
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and loop unrolling. We view sandboxing as a special “optimizer”, which
actually outputs slower (but safer) RTL. Since the sandboxing techniques we described are language and (in general) architecture neutral,
we can sandbox at the intermediate language level of compilation.
There are two main pieces to the sandboxing code. First we must arrange
for the reservation of the special sandboxing registers. Second, we must
create an optimizer that augments the RTL translation of the current function.
4.1.1

Reserving Registers

We need to reserve the five dedicated registers used in sandboxing. Since
GCC is retargetable to many platforms, it contains no register quantity
dependencies. We needed only to set a mask indicating the desired registers.
4.1.2

Augmenting Register Transfer Language

The sandboxing optimizer pass executes directly after a function is translated to RTL. RTL is the intermediate language upon which all optimizations (except peephole optimizers) occur.
The following is excerpted from the GCC Manual [stallman:gcc]:
Most of the work of the compiler is done on an intermediate representation
called register transfer language. In this language, the instructions to be output are described, pretty much one by one, in an algebraic form that describes
what the instruction does.
RTL is inspired by Lisp lists. It has both an internal form, made up of structures that point at other structures, and a textual form that is used in the
machine description and in printed debugging dumps. The textual form uses
nested parentheses to indicate the pointers in the internal form.

RTL assumes an infinite number of pseudo (or virtual) registers. Register
assignment is performed as an optimization pass. Analysis is performed
to assign a hard register or a “stack slot” (i.e. allocated from the local
variable space on the stack) to each pseudo-register.
Figure 5 shows an RTL expression (RTX). The operator is followed by a
colon and then a machine mode. A machine mode indicates the size of
the data and the representation used for it. In Figure 5 the indicated
machine mode is “DI”, which means double integer. A double integer is
a two’s complement 8-byte integer. The expression shown does not actu-
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ally “affect” any registers or memory. In order to actually change state, a
“side-effect” operator is necessary. In Figure 6 the set side-effect operator assigns the value of the second operand to the first operand.

FIGURE 5.

An RTL Expression (RTX) whose value is the bitwise and of the contents of pseudoregister 74 and the constant -1. Because of the machine mode (DI), the constant -1 will
be treated as an 8-byte two’s complement number (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF).

(and:DI (reg:DI 74) (const_int -1))

FIGURE 6.

The use of the set operator in RTL. Pseudo-register 75 is assigned the value of the
bitwise AND of the value of pseudo-register 74 and -1.

(set (reg:DI 75) (and:DI (reg:DI 74) (const_int -1)))

To sandbox a function, we must first determine which expressions need
to be sandboxed. Since we are sandboxing loads, stores, and indirect
branches and jumps, we must look for expressions that access memory.
Figure 7 shows such an expression. The mem operator returns an address
based on its operand. The expression in Figure 7 sets the value at the
address contained in pseudo-register 74 to -1.
The necessary prefix code requires an and and an or. In Figure 8, a
sequence of expressions shows a sandboxed store.

FIGURE 7.

A store and a load

(set (mem:DI (reg:DI 74))
(const_int -1))
(set (reg:DI 74)
(mem:DI (reg:DI 74)))
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FIGURE 8.

A sandboxed store. The first expression sets the segment identifier, the second
expression sets the data segment identifier. The third instruction is the store (which now
cannot access any address outside the data segment).

(set (reg:DI $kDedDataReg)
(and:DI (reg:DI 74) (reg:DI $kDedClearSegReg))
(set (reg:DI $kDedDataReg)
(ior:DI (reg:DI 74) (reg:DI $kDedDataSetSegReg))
(set (mem:DI (reg:DI 74)) (const_int -1))

4.1.3

Problems with Sandboxing and RTL

We encountered two problems with sandboxing RTL. First, target
addresses of RTL mem expressions can be system (GCC) dependent. Second, various system imposed runtime requirements are not visible in
RTL.
The target address of an RTX is often a simple reg, or an expression
which represents “register + offset” addressing (See Figure 9). However,
to optimize for addressing modes, the RTL generated for some target
addresses on an Alpha are non-standard. Figure 10 depicts a valid memory reference which has no meaning outside of the Alpha machine
description. Our normal tactic would move the target address into one of
the dedicated sandboxing registers, and then proceed to sandbox the
address. Unfortunately, since this expression can only be translated as a
target address of a mem expression, the code generator fails.

FIGURE 9.

A typical mem RTX which uses offset addressing

(mem:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 74)
(const_int 4))

FIGURE 10.

A mem RTX which uses a non-standard target address.

(mem:DI (and:DI (plus:DI (reg:DI 74)
(const_int 4)) (const_int 8))

Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation
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Runtime imposed constraints, such as function prologues, function epilogues, and global constant loading are not expressed in RTL. For each
function, the prologue and epilogue code is automatically generated by
an architecture dependent file. No function epilogue RTL code is ever
seen by our sandboxing optimizer. Thus, we can never sandbox the
frame or stack pointers in the prologue (or epilogue). Also, according the
the Digital Unix Application Binary Interface, for each global (as
opposed to static) function call, the program needs to load certain values
from a global offset table (a runtime specific global table). This sequence
includes several loads from memory that are never represented in RTL
code.
To address these problems, we augment machine description files.
4.1.4

Sandboxing Using Machine Description Files

GCC is retargetable to many platforms by using machine description files
for each system. A machine description file is a series of rules. A rule
corresponds to one or many low level virtual instructions defined by
GCC. For example, one instruction is “movsi”. The rule for “movsi”
describes how to move a single integer (for many sources and destinations). A rule can either be a series of system dependent assembly
instructions or a series of RTL functions. Figure 11 shows a “nop” rule
for the Alpha.

FIGURE 11.

A nop instruction from the Alpha machine description file. This defines the internal GCC
instruction “nop” as the Alpha instruction “bis $31,$31,$31”.

(define_insn "nop"
[(const_int 0)]
""
"bis $31,$31,$31"
[(set_attr "type" "iaddlog")])

We only need to modify the load, store, and jump GCC pseudo instructions to include sandboxing. Figure 12 shows the original and modified
rules for a load. A machine-description also includes the various functions for creating function prologues and epilogues. It is a matter of simply adding the sandboxing code, as we did for stores.
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FIGURE 12.

The first rule describes how to move from memory to a register. The %0 and %1
operators get replaced with the actual address and target registers, respectively. In the
second rule, the sequence has been modified to include sandboxing code. (The code
shown here has been simplified). Thus, for each move from memory to register both
sandboxing and loading code will be generated.

(define_insn "movdi"
[(set (match_operand:DI 0 "general_operand" "r")
(match_operand:DI 1 "input_operand" "m"))]
"register_operand (operands[0], DImode)
|| reg_or_0_operand (operands[1], DImode)"
"ldq %1, (%0)”)
(define_insn "movdi"
[(set (match_operand:DI 0 "general_operand" "r")
(match_operand:DI 1 "input_operand" "m"))]
"register_operand (operands[0], DImode)
|| reg_or_0_operand (operands[1], DImode)"
"and %0,
$kClearSegReg, $kDedDataReg \;
bis $kDedReg, $kSetSegReg,
$kDedDataReg \;
ldq %1,
($kDedReg)”)
4.2 Runtime Support

As we discussed in Section 4.2 the runtime provides all of the “operating
system” services for the software fault domain. It is the most system
dependent piece of the fault-isolation system. There are two main pieces
to the runtime. First, we need a method to trap system calls and modify
an untrusted module’s memory. Our solution uses the “/proc” file system [dig:proc, sgi:proc]. The /proc file system provides exclusive
access to an untrusted module’s memory, and also allows the trapping of
its system calls. We leverage our system on top of the system runtime
shared object services (i.e., shared libraries). Second, we need to verify
and load a module, potentially resolve symbols (i.e., runtime symbol
binding), and set up the sandboxing context for an untrusted module. We
use the system shared library loader (loader).
4.2.1

Loading an Untrusted Module

Before actually loading an untrusted module, we authenticate its creator.
By checking the signature we can determine if our trusted linker and
compiler was used. If we cannot authenticate an untrusted module it is
not permitted to execute.
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To leverage off of system components we use system loader libraries to
load shared libraries. This does not give us as much flexibility or fine
grained control over where the module is loaded, but it does mean we
need not handle relocation ourselves. We still need to know where the
code and data sections are mapped.
To determine the location of the code and data segments we use a
“secure” linker (i.e., one that signs), to place runtime object code before
and after the user module. The piece of object code that prefixes the user
module contains the unsandboxed RPC stubs (see below), and two
marker symbol pairs. One symbol pair is a start and end data symbol, the
other is a start and end code symbol. By finding the addresses of these
symbols at runtime, after the loader maps the object, we can find the start
of the code and data sections. See Figure 13.
The suffix object code also includes a static heap (see Figure 13). We
make this heap large, for it will also contain the untrusted module’s stack.
A third marker contains the size of and location of the heap. Under Digital UNIX, an unusually large data area will not cause any of the corresponding pages to be mapped until they are touched. Once the heap is
setup, the last step is to setup the stack. Currently the stack starts at the
end of the static heap.
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FIGURE 13.

The text in quotes represents symbols whose addresses resolve to the beginning and
end of each segment and also identify the malloc heap (and stack).

0x00000000

code

Code Start

Code End
Data Start

data

Heap Start

base of stack
Data End
untrusted module
0xFFFFFFFF
host

4.2.2

Crossing Fault Domains
Host to Untrusted Module

First, the called function must be resolved to the untrusted module. We
use a simple interface to the Alpha shared library loader to determine the
location of a function (by name). Even though the current implementation actually tries to find the symbol each time, this clearly can be performed one at run time. If we have a stub for each function called, then
the function address can be filled in by the loader itself, instead of our
doing it by hand. Since stubs are currently generated by hand, however,
we did not make this optimization.
To call a function in the untrusted module, in addition to normal function
call register saving, the sandbox register context must be restored, stack
pointer swapped, arguments not passed in registers copied to the
Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation
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untrusted module’s stack, and a jump to the actual function. On a DEC
Alpha this adds 10 extra instructions (ignoring the copying of parameters, which is one store per parameter) to the normal procedure call cost.
Upon return, in addition to the normal function return and register restoration, we need only swap the stack pointer and copy arguments not
passed into registers back into their stack slots on the host stack. We do
not need to save the untrusted modules register context, because those
registers are inaccessible to it.
Untrusted Module to Host

The control transfer from untrusted module to host is trickier because the
target of the jump or branch instruction will lie outside of its code segment. If direct branches and jumps are available the technique described
in Section 4.3 can be used. Unfortunately many platforms that support
direct addressing limit the number of bits available for the direct jump
(because it is assembled into the instruction), thus limiting the distance in
memory of the RPC sending stub from the target RPC receiving stub
[may:powerpc]. To gain the full range of addressable memory on a given
CPU or if the given CPU does not support direct jumps or branches,
another technique is necessary.
The technique has two pieces. First, we require a jump table. The table
must be located in a page mapped readable, but not writable or executable, in the untrusted module’s data segment. (We can drop the not executable requirement by insisting that any data in the table not be an
unsafe instruction.) The second part is a special code sequence which
prevents a rogue module from using the table load to jump to an illegal
address. We call this sequence of code Escape, and the jump table the
EscapeTable.
There are four functions that make up an untrusted-to-host RPC: the
untrusted stub, the code that loads from the jump table and jumps to the
host stub, the host stub, and the host procedure. Figure 15 shows an
overview of the process.
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FIGURE 14.

Overview of an untrusted to host RPC. This demonstrates the RPC to call a function
called “call back 2”. The steps are labelled in order of execution. Step 1, a function
called main in the untrusted module calls the untrusted stub 2. Step 2, the stub calls the
correct Escape function. Step 3, the correct escape sequence loads the address of
trusted stub 2, and jumps to it (Step 4). The control transfer is complete at step 5. At
Step 5, arguments are copied on to the host stack, and the stack pointers are swapped.
Step 6, the function call back 2 is executed.

jump
code
trusted stub 2
5

code
Escape
6
jump

3

call stub 1

4

call stub 2
call stub 3

call back 2

jump
2
load

untrusted stub 2
jump
1
main

data

data
Escape Table
&trusted stub 1
&trusted stub 2
&trusted stub 3

host

untrusted module

The untrusted stub jumps (step 1) to a particular place in Escape, which
loads (step 2) a value as a known offset into the EscapeTable, and then
jumps to that address (step 3). If we simply performed a load and a jump
through any (non dedicated) register, a rogue module could place an illegal address in the target register of the jump instruction and skip the load,
and therefore jump to an illegal address. If the target register of the jump
is our dedicated code register, we guarantee that the instruction will never
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jump to an illegal address if the rogue module skips the load and starts at
line (3) in Figure 15. This sequence is illustrated in Figure 14. However,
it is still not safe. If the untrusted module starts at (2), we will load the
value of an assembled instruction into rCode, and jump there.

FIGURE 15.

Simple version of Escape. This is a DEC Alpha assembly sequence for loading an entry
from the table and jumping to it. kOffs0 is a constant whose value is the index of the stub
entry in the table. We use the rCode register (the special register reserved for indirect
jumps) to avoid jumping to an address, other than the desired address, outside of this
fault domain. This version is still not safe. If the module jumps directly to (2), we will
jump to whatever address happens to the assembled value of the instruction at rCode.

(1)
(2)
(3)

lda rCode, kOffs0(EscapeTable); load address of entry
ldq rCode, (rCode)
; load address from jump table
jmp rZero, (rCode)
; jump to the stub

To address the problems of the simple version, we use the sequence
depicted in Figure 16. We can prove that the indirect jump in line (7) will
only exit the fault domain to an address in the untrusted module’s code
segment or an address listed in the EscapeTable. First, we know that
upon entry to any line in Escape we know that rCode contains some
valid code address and rData contains some valid data address. The correct path is to start at line (1) and in line (7) we will jump to the stub
address as in Figure 15.
If we start at (2), rData could contain any valid data address. Thus
rCode will be loaded with a potentially illegal value. In lines (3) and (4),
however, we try to load the same table entry as in (1) and (2). Since
rData will now contain the address of the stub, only two things can happen in the compare sequence in lines (5) and (6). First, in (6) we take the
branch, then rData is not equal to rCode, thus the untrusted module must
have skipped line (1), resulting in a trap. If we do not take the branch,
thus rData equals rCode. Since rData must contain the stub address, the
jump in (7) will give us the desired result.
If we start at (3), in order to take the branch in (6), rCode must already
contain the value which will be loaded from the table in (4). Thus, rCode
will contain desired stub address.
If we start in (4), rCode must equal the value at address rData if we take
the jump in (7); since, rCode is in the untrusted module’s code segment,
this does not succeed in jumping to an illegal destination.
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If we start in (5), rCode must equal rData in order to take the jump in
(7). Again, rCode must be a location within the untrusted module’s code
segment.
If we start in (6), rData will equal 0 in order to take the jump in (7).
Again, since we know rCode will be a valid code address, line (7) will
jump somewhere valid in the module’s code space.
If we start in (7), rCode must contain some valid code address, thus we
will just jump to a valid code address in the module’s segment.
Since we used rData as our target registers for the loads, we guarantee
that no loads will take place out of the valid data section.
Thus, the escape code is robust, i.e., the untrusted module may only jump
to a designated exit point (listed in the EscapeTable) or to some location
in its own code segment.
The current implementation stores the table in the code segment, and not
in the data segment. This way we know that the segment is not writable.
In order to guarantee that the untrusted module cannot jump to an entry in
the table and perform an illegal operation, we require that no entry contains an invalid instruction.

FIGURE 16.

A robust version of Escape. See the text for full explanation. This code is not the one
actually used, since we need to deal with some Alpha runtime issues (like gp and pv).
Those details were eliminated for clarity. kOffs0 is a constant whose value is 0. rZero is
the zero register on the Alpha. rCode is the dedicated code register. rData is the
dedicated data register.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
4.2.3

lda rData,
ldq rCode,
lda rData,
ldq rData,
subq rData,
bne rData,
jmp rZero,
illegal:
trap

kOffs0(EscapeTable)
(rData)
kOffs0(EscapeTable)
(rData)
rCode, rData
illegal
(rCode)

;
;
;
;
;
;
;

load address of entry
rCode = stub address
load address of entry
rData = stub address
rData = rData - rCode
if (!rData) illegal
else, jump away

; do trap stuff here

/proc and Modifying Untrusted Modules

The “/proc” file system (or procfs) allows processes to be manipulated
as files. It enables processes with the correct permissions to control the
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behavior of victim process. An entry in the “/proc” directory is created
for each valid process. The file is treated like any standard file, and
manipulated using open, close, write, ioctl, etc. The functions that
actually read and write data to the file give access to the processes’s
memory. The first address of the processes’s memory corresponds to the
first byte in the file.
Procfs provides various other services to the controlling process through
the use of ioctl. For example, we can stop a process, cause a process to

run again, or stop a process from calling a set of system calls. Fortunately the procfs is available under Digital Unix, IRIX, BSD, and
Linux. Since procfs provides a somewhat general interface to the process, we can duplicate its structure (the parts we need) on platforms that
do not yet support procfs (e.g., AIX).
We use procfs to fill in the EscapeTable (see Section 4.3) with the various addresses of the callbacks. This is quite simple using procfs. We
simply lseek to the base address of the table, and write the addresses of
the trusted stubs into the table.
To trap system calls, we use the procfs to ask the operating system to
stop on a set of system calls for the process or thread executing the
untrusted module. The host supplies a mask (a large mask) specifying
which systems calls for a particular module should be trapped. Ideally,
the host would supply a table of replacement routines for the replaced
system calls. Our current implementation, however, does not replace any
system calls, but faults if the module makes any unsafe system calls. In
future versions a replacement set of system calls will be associated with
each untrusted module context.
4.2.4

/proc, the Untrusted Module Database and Software Structure

The procfs requires either a threaded or a two process software design.
To stop (and resume) a thread or process, another process (called the
monitor) or thread must be able to wake it up. We chose a two process
design for expediency (there was example code available). At start-up a
host that wishes to load untrusted modules calls a library function that
forks off a process that subsequently opens the procfs file for the host
process. This file is opened with the permission “O_EXCL” which means
that only one process can have a file descriptor to the file for that process
(so that the untrusted module cannot modify itself). We call the process
opened the victim. Thus, the host (and its loaded untrusted module) is
the victim. We create two communication channels between the victim
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and the monitor. The first is a pipe (which is faked to be bidirectional,
by using two pipes), and the second is a shared memory area. The shared
memory area is the central database where all the current information
about an untrusted module is stored. Concurrent write access to the data
base is controlled using messages communicated over the pipe. We
chose not to use semaphores for expediency. The current software allows
for only one possible writer to the database. This will need to be changed
in the event of a threaded model.
Figure 17 shows the architecture of the complete system. The monitor
process waits for activity on the file descriptor attached to the communication pipe or the descriptor attached to the monitor process (using the
poll system call, which actually blocks). The victim can send 4 different
messages to the monitor: new untrusted module, unlock database,
lock database, and shutdown.

FIGURE 17.

The Architecture of the Software Based Fault Isolation System

communication
pipe

shared database

pipe and
procfs
monitor

host code
and library
to load
untrusted
modules

untrusted
module

monitor process

victim/host

The “new untrusted module” message is sent to the monitor when a
new module has been loaded into memory and placed in the database.
Included in this message is the address of the EscapeTable. Next, the
monitor writes the callback addresses into the table.
Implementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation
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“Lock database” and “unlock database” messages are sent to guarantee exclusive access to the database. These can be used to modify the
database and avoid race conditions.
The “shutdown” message is sent when the host terminates. Any cleanup
should be performed. Currently no cleanup is necessary.
5.0 Performance
To evaluate the performance of software-enforced fault isolation we used
our prototype system on a 133Mhz DEC Alpha 3000 300X running Digital Unix 3.2. We evaluate the speed of our RPC mechanism, and determine the cost of fault isolation on various benchmarks.
5.1 Sandboxing Overhead

We measured the execution times and self-reported values (such as
FLOPS) for various benchmarks. We treated each benchmark as an
untrusted module, and sandboxed all of its code. Table 1 shows the
changes in execution time and benchmark value. We use non-sandboxed
code as the baseline performance. The overhead of register reservation
(recall the five dedicated registers) and the overhead of the additional
sandboxing instructions is reported. The value for sandboxing overhead
includes the the reserved register overhead. Positive values indicate that
the benchmark ran slower. In general, floating point benchmarks slowed
down less than integer benchmarks. We used Al Aburto’s set of widely
used benchmarks [aburto:bench].
Table 1 contains various anomalies. For example, flops1 reports that
the sandboxed version was actually 7.58% faster than non-sandboxed
code. In many cases the code with a reduced register executed faster than
the normal code. In each of these cases the result was nominal and not
statistically significant. Notice that register reservation overhead is about
2-3%, however, while sandboxing overhead is about 20 - 30% (though as
low as 1%).
The benchmarks we tested used little or no I/O. The more I/O an application uses, in general, the lower the cost of sandboxing.
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TABLE 1.

Sandboxing and Register Reservation Overhead. Column 1 indicates the name and
type of the benchmark. An “int” designates a primarily integer-based benchmark. An “fp”
designates a primarily floating point-based benchmark. Columns 2 and 3 compares the
performance of each benchmark compiled without the use of the dedicated sandboxing
registers to the performance of the benchmark normally compiled. Positive values
indicate slower performance. A “benchmark value” is the self-reported value. For
example, the flops benchmark reports “FLOPS” or floating point operations per second.
Columns 3 and 4 indicate the performance of benchmarks compiled with the sandboxing
registers reserved and the sandboxing code inserted.
benchmark

reserved register overhead

name/type
c4
dhry1
dhry2
fft
flops1
flops2
flops3
flops4
hanoi
heapsort
clinpack1
clinpack2
clinpack3
clinpack4
mm1
mm2
mm3
mm4
nsieve
queens
tfftdp

average

int
int
int
fp
fp
fp
fp
fp
int
int
fp
fp
fp
fp
fp
fp
fp
fp
int
int
fp

sandboxing overhead

benchmark value
(%)

elapsed
time(%)

benchmark value
(%)

elapsed
time(%)

4.68
0.361
32.6

4.88
0.33
20.1
0.359
-0.327

35.1
29.6
30.8

68.6
42.0
23.3
0.894
1.85

0.956
0.277
0.147
0.005
-0.514
5.44
-1.69
2.34
0.316
-0.551
0.00
0.00
9.91
0.00

-2.06
2.90

-0.797
7.03
-0.714
2.45
0.291
0.794
0.00
-2.68
10.9
-6.91
3.53
1.07
-2.03
2.13

-7.58
1.70
1.90
2.50
39.2
16.6
24.2
29.1
26.0
27.6
35.7
20.0
27.3
42.9

0.155
21.2

18.1
55.3
27.9
32.5
31.0
33.7
34.0
22.5
29.4
26.8
27.9
38.2
0.0103
28.6

5.2 Cross Fault Domain Performance

We measured the performance of host-to-untrusted-module RPCs, and
untrusted-module-to-host RPCs. Each RPC took no arguments and
returned no value. For comparison, we compared the execution time for
void function calls determined by Wahbe, et al [wahbe:sfi]. Function
performance performance provides a lower bound on the performance of
an RPC. In addition, we timed the round trip cost of sending a byte
between two processes using the pipe mechanism. Table 2 shows the
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results of our experiments. Notice that our RPCs are 2 orders of magnitude faster than the byte sending test. This is due to our extremely inexpensive context switches, conservative register saving, and no traps into
the kernel.
We attribute the difference in costs between the two RPCs in Columns 1
and 2 to our implementation. In a future implementation this cost would
be equal.

TABLE 2.

RPC Performance. Column 1 indicates the cost of a C procedure call with no
parameters and no return value. Column 2 shows the cost of host-to-untrusted-module
RPC. Column 3 shows the cost of an untrusted-to-host-module RPC. Column 3 shows
the cost of sending a byte round trip between two processes using the pipe mechanism.

C void
procedure call
0.06 µs

Host to
Untrusted Module
5.32 µs

Untrusted to
Host Module
3.22 µs

Pipe Byte
Sending
141.1 µs

6.0 Limitations, and future directions
6.1 Current System Limitations

The current system does not perform any verification or authentication of
untrusted modules. To sign modules, we need to augment our trusted
compiler to use a public key encryption system such as pgp
[garfinkel:pgp].
The method of using procfs to trap system calls requires an extra context switch for each system call. This is not necessary if we modify the
untrusted module to call RPCs in place of system calls. The RPCs would
call trusted code which would replicate many of the (permitted) system
call services.
We have not performed any of the optimizations described in Section 4.4.
In order to perform the “guard page” optimization we probably need to
implement our own “loader” untrusted modules. As previously
described, using the system loader does not give us the fine grained control we need to allow for the insertion of guard pages.
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6.2 Future Directions

The current system only executes on an Alpha running Digital Unix. The
system should be ported to other platforms to determine the system’s
portability. An Alpha runtime verifier should be created to determine the
start-up costs of loading a module. In the case of a network module (such
as a Java Applet), its purpose may be to execute a short piece of code and
terminate. An large start-up time might outweigh the use of a runtime
verifier.
Although we demonstrated a prototype system that can execute untrusted
modules, we have not shown a full application of the technology. We
suggest three types of applications: (1) an extensible kernel such as
SPIN, but using sandboxed untrusted modules to insulate the kernel from
the modules, (2) applications like Adobe Photoshop or Netscape Navigator that load modules to handle different types of data on single address
space operating systems such as the MacOS, (3) extensible applications,
such as databases, which require user modules to handle user defined
types (on UNIX-type operating systems).
7.0 Related Work
Much of the original theory presented in this paper was created by Robert
Wahbe, et. al. in their paper [wahbe:sfi].
Many researchers have tried to increase RPC performance [bershad:lrpc,
birrel:rpc]. RPCs are bound by the hardware limit of two context
switches, and two kernel traps. Implementations such as LRPC have
approached the hardware limit, thus suggesting another method for performing RPC [bershad:lrpc].
Some operating systems use type safe languages, trusted compilers and
trusted linkers to make untrusted modules secure [bershad:spin]. For
example, SPIN uses a type safe language for modules linked into the kernel. Although this adequately protects the kernel, and provides good performance, it limits the extension of the operating system to languages not
normally used for operating system development (such as Modula-3). In
addition, many other researchers are working on extensible operating
systems [osdi:panel, engler:exokernel, seltzer:case].
The Omniware system compiles source files to its own Omniware virtual
machine (OmniwareVM) and runtime [colusa:omniware, adl-t:omnimoImplementation and Analysis of Software Based Fault Isolation
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bile]. When the compiled objects need to be executed, they are translated
to native platform objects with inserted sandboxing checks to provide
fault isolation. They report that sandboxed code runs on average 9%
slower than non-sandboxed code (although they do not sandbox loads).
8.0 Conclusion
We described a system for software-based fault isolation. This method
creates logical fault domains within a single address space. By using a
single address space, RPCs between fault domains are extremely fast
because they are not bound by context switch time. In addition software
fault isolation provides a method for creating multiple address spaces
under operating systems that support only a single address space.
To protect memory outside of an untrusted module’s logical fault domain
we used a technique called sandboxing was used. This technique augments the code of an untrusted module so that a module can only access
memory within its own fault domain. To exit its fault domain the
untrusted module makes a relatively inexpensive RPC. The runtime
overhead for sandboxing an untrusted module is approximately 30% on a
DEC Alpha. For frequently communicating modules or applications that
perform large amounts of I/O the cost of sandboxing decreases (because
for inter-process communication, context switch time take the majority of
time), thus making it an attractive solution. In situations, such as a kernel, where only one address space is available, software-based fault isolation provides near native speeds for untrusted modules without
decreasing kernel reliability.
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